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ARTICLE 
Choosing Your Ground on the Endangered 
Species Act: How Do the Ninth, Tenth, and 
District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal 
Evaluate Water Management Decisions Made 
by Federal Water Agencies?   
 
MICHAEL KINSEY* 
 
The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally,  
but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces  
of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers, and 
distances, constitutes the test of a great general. He who knows 
these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice,  
will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, 
will surely be defeated. 
- Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, ca. 450 B.C. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is, perhaps, overly dramatic to label litigation as a war, 
waged with word-spears on the field of battle in a courtroom, 
fought by modern-day knights dressed in ornate battle-garb. 
 
 * The author received his B.S. in Fisheries Science from Oregon State 
University, and his J.D. from the University of Oregon School of Law.  He is a 
member of the Oregon Bar, and currently works in natural resources 
management in the Pacific Northwest.  The author would like to thank Professor 
Adell Amos and the students of the Spring 2014 ‘Advanced Topics in Water Law 
Writing Colloquium’, in which early drafts of this article were written.  The 
feedback and review of Professor Amos and the class were invaluable in those 
drafts and the writing process.  
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Overly dramatic, perhaps, but not necessarily inaccurate. If we 
continue the metaphor, then the difficulties, dangers, and 
distances within the courtroom, and the natural formation of the 
country, the courtroom itself, are what the lawyer today must 
master, lest he or she be defeated on the field. 
Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army 
Corps), operate a large number of water development and delivery 
projects throughout the western United States. Agency managers 
of the projects make operational decisions that govern how those 
projects are implemented. These decisions are discretionary 
actions subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).1 Agency implementation of the 
ESA on water projects is often the target of litigation filed under 
the ESA’s citizen suit provision.2 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, federal agencies 
are responsible for the development and implementation of ESA 
documents, and knowing what a court will look for and at when 
that document is challenged can help the agencies to develop a 
document that can better survive court review. Second, a plaintiff 
who challenges such a document can benefit from that same 
knowledge, by knowing which elements of the document to best 
challenge. The intent of this article is to provide practitioners, both 
agency and non-, with an introduction to that knowledge, to 
identify some of those difficulties, dangers, and distances, with the 
ultimate goal of adding clarity to an often confusing battlefield. 
This article first provides, in Part II, an overview of how the 
ESA applies to federal actions, and then discusses in Part III how 
the Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of 
Appeal analyze, under the ESA, the decisions made by the federal 
agencies. The discussion includes specific analytic tests the courts 
have developed. Finally, in Part IV, the article describes a 
hypothetical decision on a large river system with multiple dams 
 
1. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012). 
2. Id. § 1540(g). 
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operated by Reclamation and the Army Corps as a hypothetical3 
case study to illustrate the Courts’ tests. 
Different federal circuits utilize different tests to determine 
whether or not the decisions made under the ESA satisfy the 
statute and court precedent. The intent of this article is to 
illustrate the particular criteria some of the courts use in those 
tests, and thus to provide information for federal agencies and 
litigants to use in crafting their documents and, if necessary, their 
arguments. 
II.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The ESA has been called “the most comprehensive legislation 
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any 
nation.”4 Part II discusses the application of the ESA to federal 
actions. The heart of that application is the interagency 
consultation requirements of section 7 of the ESA,5 but section 7 
does not exist in a vacuum. To understand section 7, an 
understanding of sections 4 and 9 of the ESA is first necessary. In 
short, section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking 
discretionary actions which will jeopardize the existence of a 
species listed under section 4, or which will destroy or adversely 
modify its critical habitat.6  Critical habitat is ideally but not 
always designated under section 4 when a species is listed,7 and 
applies only to discretionary federal actions.8 In addition, all 
persons, including federal agencies, are subject to the prohibitions 
of section 9.9 This article provides a brief history of the ESA, 
followed by a discussion of sections 4 and 9 before moving to section 
7.   
 
3. The hypothetical operating decision described in this paper is derived from 
actual decisions made by federal water managers, but is not based on any specific 
decision made by any specific agency. 
4. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA) v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). 
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
6. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
7. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
8. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
9. Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
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Congress passed the Endangered Species Preservation Act 
(ESPA, or 1966 Act), the forerunner to the ESA, in 1966, and 
amended it in 1969 as the Endangered Species Conservation Act 
(ESCA).10 The Department of the Interior issued the first listings 
of species under the ESCA.11 Originally, the Department of the 
Interior was responsible for implementation of the ESCA, but the 
responsibilities were later split between the Secretaries of the 
Interior (through the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, USFWS) and 
Commerce (through the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS, 
now NOAA Fisheries) in 1970.12 The ESA itself, which repealed the 
1966 Act,13 was passed by Congress, and signed into law by 
President Nixon in 1973.14 Currently, the implementing 
responsibilities of the ESA remain split between the two 
Departments, with Commerce responsible for marine and 
anadromous fish and most marine mammals and invertebrates, 
and Interior responsible for terrestrial species and all birds.15 The 
two Departments share responsibility for the ESA and its 
application to sea turtles.16 
A. Section 4 
Section 4 is the first substantive step under the ESA to species 
protection. Species are listed under section 4 of the ESA as 
 
10. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., A HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
OF 1973, at 1 http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/history_ESA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4DTS-HCVT]. 
11. See, e.g., 32 Fed. Reg. 3961, 4001 (Mar. 8, 1967). 
12. U.S. Code, Title V, Appendix 1, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 
Fed. Reg. 194 (Oct. 6, 1970). 
13. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat. 903 
(1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544). 
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. 
15. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1971), reprinted in 84 
Stat. 2090-93 (1970), and in 35 Fed. Reg. 15627-30 (1970), and reprinted with 
amendments in 5 U.S.C. app. At 1557-61 (1994). 
16. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE U.S. FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE AND THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE IN JOINT 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 AS TO MARINE TURTLES 
(July 18, 1977), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/turtle_mou.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/CVK3-FCCN]. 
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endangered17 or threatened.18 The Secretary (of Interior or 
Commerce, depending on the species) may on his/her own initiative 
begin the listing process.19  Alternatively, any person may petition 
the Secretary to list a species.20 To the maximum extent 
practicable, within ninety days after receiving such a petition the 
Secretary must make a determination (a “90 day finding”) 
“whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial 
information indicating that the petitioned action may be 
warranted.”21 If so, the Secretary must then commence a twelve 
month status review, including requesting information from the 
public about the species and its status, as well as threats to the 
species.22 The USFWS has issued a policy to establish how they 
will prioritize listing decisions.23 
At the end of that twelve months, the Secretary must make 
one of three possible findings: 1) that listing the species is not 
warranted; 2) that listing the species is warranted, after which she 
must publish in the Federal Register a proposed rule for the listing; 
or 3) that the listing is warranted but precluded by other pending 
listing proposals.24 In making her determinations, the Secretary 
may only consider five factors: “A) the present or threatened 
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; B) 
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; C) disease or predation; D) the inadequacy 
of existing regulatory mechanisms; or E) other natural or 
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.”25 
The Secretary is to consider the best scientific and commercial 
data available, and to take into consideration any efforts by states 
 
17. “In danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). 
18. “Likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. § 1532(20). 
19. Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
20. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B). 
23. Methodology for Prioritizing Status Reviews and Accompanying 12-
Month Findings on Petitions for Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 49,248 (July 27, 2016). 
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B). 
25. Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
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or foreign nations to protect the species.26 The Secretary may not 
consider economic factors in the listing decision.27 The same 
process is used to determine if a species that is currently listed 
should be delisted or have its status changed.28 The listing process 
is subject to the rule making requirements of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA).29 
Section 4 also governs the designation of critical habitat,30 and 
like listing species is subject to the rule making requirements of 
the APA.31 Critical habitat is 
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the 
species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of 
section 1533 of this title, on which are found those physical or 
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species 
and (II) which may require special management considerations or 
protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographical area 
occupied by the species at the time it is listed in accordance with 
the provisions of section 1533 of this title, upon a determination 
by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation 
of the species.32 
The Secretary, in designating critical habitat, is to make the 
decision based on “the best scientific data available and after 
taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on 
national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any 
particular area as critical habitat.”33 In making her decision, the 
Secretary publishes with the proposed rule a draft economic 
analysis of the rule, describing the economic effects of the proposed 
designation.34 
 
26. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
27. Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–304, 96 Stat 1411 (1982). 
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). 
29. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 161 n.11 (1978). 
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). 
33. Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
34. 50 C.F.R. § 424.19(a) (2016). 
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Finally, for purposes of this article, section 4 also governs the 
development of recovery plans for listed species.35 Recovery plans 
are “road maps” designed by the Secretary to guide the 
conservation and survival of listed species, to the point where the 
species is no longer in need of the ESA’s protections.36 “Recovery 
goals must include: (1) “site-specific management actions . . . 
necessary to achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and 
survival of the species,” (2) “objective, measurable criteria” that 
would lead toward delisting, and (3) time and cost estimates “to 
carry out those measures.” 37 “The Secretary must also provide the 
opportunity for public notice and comment before final approval of 
a recovery plan, and “prior to implementation of a new or revised 
recovery plan, consider all information presented during the public 
comment period.”38  Compliance with recovery plans is voluntary,39 
but USFWS and NOAA Fisheries must consider the effects of a 
proposed federal action on species recovery when writing biological 
opinions.40 
In sum, under section 4 of the ESA the USFWS and NOAA 
Fisheries must identify species that are in danger of extinction or 
that may become endangered, as well as the habitat that is critical 
to their survival and recovery. In addition, section 4 requires the 
agencies to develop road maps of specific actions and criteria that 
will lead to the recovery of each species. 
B. Section 9 
 Section 9 is the “prohibited acts” section of the ESA. It 
applies to any person,41 a definition that includes  
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any 
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, 
 
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). 
36. Id. 
37. Grand Canyon Tr. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1023 
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)). 
38. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(f)(4)-(5)). 
39. Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Fund for Animals v. Rice, 85 F.3d. 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996). 
40. Grand Canyon Trust, 691 F.3d at 1023; see discussion of section 7, infra. 
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). 
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or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, 
municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign 
government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a 
State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.42   
It prohibits the import, export, and taking of any endangered 
fish or wildlife species within the U.S. or its territorial seas or any 
threatened species protected by regulations issued under the ESA, 
and the sale or shipping for interstate or foreign commerce.43 Take 
is defined to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct.”44 The USFWS has further defined, by regulation, ‘harm’ 
as “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife,” including by 
habitat modification.45 ‘Harass’ is defined, also by regulation, as 
“an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the 
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as 
to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns.”46  The take 
prohibition as it relates to habitat applies to all of the habitat that 
a species relies on, but the destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat applies only to federal actions and is separate from 
the requirements of section 9.47  In contrast to fish and wildlife 
species, listed plants may not be imported or exported, removed 
from federal property, cut or dug up or damaged or destroyed in 
knowing violation of any state law, or sold or shipped for interstate 
or foreign commerce, but the ESA does not specifically prohibit 
‘take’ of listed plants.48   
 Thus, in relevant part section 9 applies to federal agencies, 
and prohibits those agencies from taking listed species, including 
by damaging habitat those species rely on. 
 
42. Id. § 1532(13). 
43. Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
44. Id. § 1532(19). 
45. Babbitt, Sec’y of Interior, et al. v Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., et al., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) (50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016)). 
46. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). 
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
48. Id. § 1538(a)(2). 
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C. Section 7 
Section 7 of the ESA governs interagency (between federal 
agencies) cooperation.49  Section 7(a)(2) requires each federal 
agency to insure that any action (“all activities or programs of any 
kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by 
Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas”)50 it 
authorizes, funds, or carries out does not jeopardize the existence 
of a listed species or destroy or adversely modify designated critical 
habitat.51 To jeopardize the existence of a species is to engage in an 
action that would, directly or indirectly, be reasonably expected to 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in 
the wild, by reducing numbers, reproduction, or distribution of that 
species.52 A similar definition in the regulations for adverse 
modification of critical habitat was held to be invalid by several 
courts.53 As a result of those opinions, the Secretaries by policy 
disavowed the regulatory definition of adverse modification, and 
used the intent of the statute to guide their interpretation of the 
term.54 The Secretaries then promulgated a revised regulation 
redefining adverse modification of critical habitat as a  
direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value 
of critical habitat for the conservation of a listed species. Such 
alterations may include, but are not limited to, those that alter the 
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of a 
 
49. Id. § 1536. 
 50. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016). 
51. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
52. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
53. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 
1069 (9th Cir. 2004); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 
F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001). 
54. See Memorandum from William T. Hogarth, Director, Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., to the Reg’l Adm’rs, Office of Protected Res. (Nov. 7, 2005) (on file 
with author) (on the application of the “Destruction or Adverse Modification” 
Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act). 
 
9
 140 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
species or that preclude or significantly delay development of such 
features.55 
There are limits to how far section 7 may go. The limit most 
relevant to this article is that only discretionary federal actions are 
subject to the section 7 process, while non-discretionary federal 
actions are not.56 A complex federal action which is comprised of 
multiple elements, some of which are discretionary and some are 
not, is still subject to section 7 for the entirety of the action, for all 
elements.57 A second limitation is that only affirmative acts are 
subject to section 7.58 What triggers consultation is an agency 
action, not the listing of a species by USFWS or NOAA Fisheries.59 
An existing, ongoing action does not require consultation unless 
one or more of four specific criteria (which are not relevant to this 
article) are met.60 
1. The Section 7 Process 
The section 7 process, or ‘consultation’, is reasonably 
straightforward, at least in theory. The federal agency taking the 
action, also called the ‘action agency’ must first determine whether 
the action is discretionary.61 If it is, then the action agency 
determines if the action may affect a listed species or designated 
critical habitat.62 If not, because there are no listed species in the 
action area63 or because the action is not one that will affect the 
 
55. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; 
Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 
7214 (February 11, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.02). 
56. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. EPA, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (citing 50 
C.F.R. § 402.03 (2016)). 
57. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 928 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
58. Cal. Sportfishing Protection All. v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
59. Id. at 597. 
60. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. 
61. Id. § 402.03. 
62. Id. § 402.14(a). 
63. Id. § 402.02 (an action area includes “all areas to be affected directly or 
indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the immediate area involved in 
the action”). 
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species or the critical habitat, then no consultation is required and 
the agency’s obligation is satisfied.64 If the action may affect a 
species or critical habitat, then the action agency will prepare a 
Biological Assessment (BA), the contents of which are at the 
discretion of the action agency, and which evaluates the effects of 
the proposed action on the listed species and designated critical 
habitat.65 If the action agency determines that the action is not 
likely to adversely affect the species, and the appropriate 
regulatory agency concurs in writing, then the action agency’s 
consultation requirements are complete.66 If, however, the action 
is likely to adversely affect the species, then the regulatory agency 
will prepare a biological opinion (BiOp).67 
The BiOp is the opinion of the Secretary whether the proposed 
federal action will jeopardize the existence of the species or destroy 
or adversely modify the critical habitat.68 The BiOp must use the 
“best commercial and scientific information available” in its 
analysis,69 and will resolve ambiguities in favor of the species.70 
Note however that the requirement to use the best commercial and 
scientific information does not require the agencies to use the best 
information possible, only the best information available.71 The 
regulation also specifies that the BiOp is to be completed within 
135 days unless the two agencies agree to a longer time72 although 
no court has issued an order compelling the completion of a BiOp 
because of violation of that time requirement.73 While the 
consultation is ongoing, the action agency may not take any action 
 
64. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1019 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Defs. of Wildlife v. Flowers, 414 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2005). 
65. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12. 
66. Id. § 402.13. 
67. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
68. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8). 
70. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
71. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (citing Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 
2001)). 
72. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e). 
73. Courts have issued orders directing agencies to consult, and to complete 
consultation under case-specific timelines, but none for violation of the statutory 
timelines. 
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that would have the effect of preventing the regulatory agency from 
developing a reasonable and prudent alternative (see below).74 
The BiOp is, as mentioned, the Secretary’s opinion. If the 
Secretary finds that the action will not jeopardize the existence of 
a listed species, or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat, 
then the opinion will provide the rationale for that finding.75 If 
otherwise, then the BiOp will include one or more Reasonable and 
Prudent Alternatives (RPA), if any are available.76 An RPA is an 
alternative to the proposed action that would not jeopardize a 
species or adversely modify critical habitat,77 which is consistent 
with the intended purpose of the action, is within the action 
agency’s authority and jurisdiction, and is technologically and 
economically feasible.78 The action agency should be involved in 
the development of any RPA to be included in the BiOp.79 
Whether the BiOp finds jeopardy or not, it will also include an 
Incidental Take Statement (ITS).80 The ITS is a description of the 
take that will occur from the proposed action but is incidental to 
that action (is not the intent of the action), and will describe the 
effects of the take on the species.81 The ITS must, to the extent 
possible, precisely quantify the amount and extent of the take, 
although USFWS and NOAA Fisheries have issued regulations 
that allow the use of surrogates in an ITS when precise 
quantification is not possible.82 When a surrogate is used in an ITS, 
the ITS must describe  
 
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). 
75. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016). 
79. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, 4-43 (1998), https://www.fws. 
gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/esa_section7_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V 
R4-EVTB]. 
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
81. Id. 
82. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; 
Incidental Take Statements, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832 (May 11, 2015) (to be codified at 
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(7)). 
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the causal link between the surrogate and the take of the listed 
species, explain[s] why it is not practical to express the amount or 
extent of anticipated take or to monitor take-related impacts in 
terms of individuals of the listed species, and set[s] a clear 
standard for determining when the level of anticipated take has 
been exceeded.83  
The ITS will also include those Reasonable and Prudent Measures 
(RPMs) which will, in the opinion of the Secretary, minimize the 
effect of the take on the species or critical habitat, along with 
Terms and Conditions that implement the RPMs.84 The ITS, with 
its attendant RPMs, functions as an exemption to the prohibitions 
against take found in section 9; essentially, the ITS functions as a 
permit.85 The RPMs are mandatory conditions of that permit, and 
if not adhered to result in the exemption being no longer valid.86 In 
the event an RPA is provided, the action agency has the choice of 
whether or not to accept and implement the RPA.87 Once the 
consultation process is complete, the action agency may implement 
the action (or the RPA).88 Because the ESA does not specifically 
prohibit the take of listed plants, no ITS is required for a proposed 
action which harms such plants.89 
In sum, when the action agency determines it intends to take 
a discretionary action that may adversely affect a species listed or 
critical habitat designated under section 4, it will initiate 
consultation with the appropriate regulatory agency under section 
7. The regulatory agency will respond with an opinion whether or 
not the proposed action will jeopardize the existence of the species 
or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. The opinion will 
also include an ITS, which exempts the action agency from the 
prohibitions of section 9, so long as the mandatory conditions of the 
exemption are adhered to. The opinion may include an RPA, which 
will avoid jeopardizing the species or destroying or adversely 
 
83. Id. 
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016). 
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997). 
86. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170. 
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.15. 
88. Id. 
89. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 833 F.3d 1136 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 
13
 144 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
modifying its critical habitat. Once the action agency decides what 
action it will take, the section 7 consultation process is complete. 
The section 7 process is simple and straightforward . . . on 
paper. In reality, federal agency practitioners devote considerable 
amounts of time, energy, and expertise to working through what is 
truthfully a highly complex process. Federal agency biologists, 
managers, and attorneys do not simply wave their hands, utter a 
Potter-esque “Apparent documentum”90 and have the final BA and 
BiOp arrive neatly on their computer screens. Instead, these 
practitioners spend countless hours developing processes to 
analyze the effects of proposed federal actions, and then countless 
more conducting those analyses. The final BiOp is the result of 
action and regulatory agencies analyzing, writing, reviewing, 
reanalyzing, revising, reviewing again, and finally signing.91 
Because these processes are so complex they frequently end up in 
court as a means of challenging the underlying agency decision, 
where the document’s survival or reversal/remand turns on how 
well it meets that court’s test. 
III.  THE ANALYTIC TESTS OF THE NINTH, TENTH, 
AND D.C. CIRCUITS 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has come the closest to 
articulating a specific test for evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp. 
In part, this is likely the result simply of the Ninth Circuit hearing 
more ESA cases related to BiOps. The D.C. Circuit has not 
articulated a specific test at all. This, likely, is because the D.C. 
Circuit is the more typical venue for legal challenges related to 
listing decisions, critical habitat designations, and recovery plans, 
instead of challenges to actions taken as a result of those decisions. 
The Tenth Circuit is somewhere in the middle in regards to its 
development of a test, having developed one but less clearly than 
the Ninth Circuit. In addition, the three Circuits selected for this 
article’s analysis have very different approaches to environmental 
 
90. Latin for “Document appear.” 
91. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONDUCTING JEOPARDY ANALYSES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT (2004),  http://www.fpir.noaa.gov/Library/PRD/ESA%20Consultation/NMFS 
%202004%20-%20Analytical%20Framework-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ5S-WJ 
FL]. 
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review. The Ninth Circuit historically is generally sympathetic to 
challenges to agency decisions under environmental statutes, the 
Tenth Circuit less so, and the D.C. Circuit somewhere in the 
middle. Regardless, this section describes the Ninth Circuit’s ‘test’, 
and that of the Tenth and D.C. Circuits to the extent one can be 
identified. All challenges to the adequacy of a BiOp are evaluated, 
regardless of Circuit, under the familiar arbitrary and capricious 
standard of section 706 of the APA.92 Any piece of the BiOp which 
can be found to be in violation of that standard, regardless of 
whether it is part of an express test or not, will likely cause the 
court to strike down the BiOp and remand it back to the regulatory 
agency for revision.93 
A. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has never explicitly stated its analytic test 
or tests for determining whether a BiOp and the underlying agency 
action are compliant with the ESA. Two cases, however, are 
instructive. 
The first is Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service.94 The relevant holding from this case, that the definition 
promulgated in regulation by NOAA Fisheries and the USFWS for 
destroying or adversely modifying critical habitat is invalid, 
followed the holdings in two prior cases from the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits.95 The Court found that the definition in the regulations 
“reads the ‘recovery’ goal out of the adverse modification inquiry; a 
proposed action ‘adversely modifies’ critical habitat if, and only if, 
the value of the critical habitat for survival is appreciably 
diminished.” (emphasis in original).96 The court followed the two 
 
92. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 174 (1997). 
93. See, e.g., Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1320 (10th 
Cir. 2007); Oceana, Inc. v Gutierrez, 488 F.3d 1020, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ariz. 
Cattle Grower’s Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Bureau of Land Mgmt., 273 
F.3d 1229, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2001). 
94. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
95. N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 
1283 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 
441-42 (5th Cir. 2001). 
96. Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069. 
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prior Circuits in striking down the regulation, and held that the 
statutory language of the ESA stated that “destruction or adverse 
modification could occur when sufficient critical habitat is lost so 
as to threaten a species’ recovery even if there remains sufficient 
critical habitat for the species’ survival.”97 In essence, the court 
held that the regulatory agencies could not limit their adverse 
modification analysis, but instead that adverse modification could 
be found where the value of the habitat is appreciably diminished 
for the survival or the recovery of the species. 
The agencies’ regulations were, in the opinion of the courts, 
placing an unwarranted restriction on the statutory text. The 
recovery of a species, to the point it no longer needs the protections 
of the ESA, is a much higher standard than mere survival, but the 
then regulatory definition made no distinction between the two. 
The agencies were thus prevented from finding adverse 
modification of the critical habitat where the federal action merely 
left enough of the habitat for the species to persist. Accordingly, an 
evaluation of the value of the habitat for survival or recovery is the 
first piece of the test the Ninth Circuit will bring to bear in its 
analysis. The holding from this case, still good law, was the final 
genesis of the regulatory agencies’ efforts to revise the definition of 
adverse modification of critical habitat described earlier, and the 
revised definition was specifically crafted to reflect the holding of 
this line of cases.98 
A second case from the Ninth Circuit, National Wildlife 
Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 99 is more recent, 
and one in which the court further articulated elements of its 
analytic approach.  
In this case, one in a long line of challenges, environmental 
groups challenged the BiOp written by NOAA Fisheries (then 
NMFS) for the Federal Columbia River Power System dams and 
related facilities.100 The court first held that the regulatory agency 
 
97. Id. at 1070. 
98. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; 
Incidental Take Statements. 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832 (May 11, 2015) (to be codified at 
50 C.F.R. pt. 402.14(g)(7)). 
99. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
100. Id. 
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had to evaluate the effects of the federal action on the 
environmental baseline,101 which includes “the context of other 
existing human activities that impact the listed species.”102 For 
example, the existence of dams on a river system which are already 
endangering listed species is one facet of that context within the 
environmental baseline. The proposed federal action must be 
evaluated within that baseline.103 Part of this analysis is 
identifying what pieces of the action are discretionary and which 
ones are not, while evaluating the entirety of the action against 
that baseline.104 Identifying correctly what is properly in the 
environmental baseline is thus another element of the court’s 
analytic test. 
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the regulatory agencies 
must “consider the near term habitat effects to populations with 
short life cycles.”105 To appropriately consider this, the regulatory 
agency must assess the effects of the action over time, especially 
when evaluating those effects over the life span of the species.106 
The BiOp thus cannot look only at the long term or the short term 
effects, but must look at both. 
A fourth element the Circuit has articulated is the ability of 
the action agency and the regulatory agency to definitively identify 
future actions, either as part of the baseline or as mitigation, for 
their analyses. The action agency must have a clear commitment 
and ability to implement the specified future actions before the 
regulatory agency can correctly include them in the analysis.107 A 
general intention to implement some actions intended to benefit 
 
101. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). The environmental baseline is, essentially, 
the current conditions of the action area in addition to the anticipated effects of 
federal actions which have already undergone section 7 consultation.  It is what 
the effects of the proposed action are measured on. 
102. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 930. 
103. Id. at 930-31. 
104. Id. at 928. 
105. Id. at 934 (citing Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
106. Pac. Coast Fed’n, 426 F.3d at 1094. 
107. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 935-36 (“. . . [W]e are not persuaded 
that even a sincere general commitment to future improvements may be included 
in the proposed action in order to offset its certain immediate negative effects, 
absent specific and binding plans.”). 
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listed species is not definitive enough to be included in the analysis 
or relied on in it.108 When the action agency has the desire but lacks 
the power or authority to reasonably guarantee that the desired 
actions will be implemented, the regulatory agency must “exclude 
them from the analysis and consider only those actions that are 
reasonably certain to occur.”109 Thus, the project description must 
be accurate, complete, and within the power of the action agency 
to implement. 
Finally, the court has identified one last element. For the BiOp 
to have a valid analysis, the regulatory agency must have some 
idea of at what point the existence of that listed species will 
actually be in jeopardy.110 It is not enough for the regulatory 
agency to suspect that a species will be jeopardized, the agency 
must have a basis in science and the law to sustain the jeopardy 
determination.111 When habitat is already degraded the regulatory 
agency should logically “know roughly at what point survival and 
recovery will be placed at risk before it may conclude that no harm 
will result from ‘significant’ impairments to habitat.”112 Thus, the 
regulatory agency cannot assert without reason that the proposed 
federal action will or will not violate section 7(a)(2), it must have a 
basis to support its opinion based on knowledge of the “tipping 
point” of the species. 
Ultimately, then, the Ninth Circuit’s analytic test, as derived 
from the discussion above, tests the following points: 
1) an evaluation of the value of the habitat for survival or 
recovery; 
2) an identification of what is properly in the environmental 
baseline; 
3) an analysis of both the long term and the short term 
effects; 
4) a project description which is accurate, complete, and 
within the power of the action agency to implement; and 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 936 n.17. 
110. Id. at 936. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/3
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5) a scientific basis by the regulatory agency of at what 
point the existence of the listed species will actually be in 
jeopardy. 
B. The Tenth Circuit 
 The Tenth Circuit has not articulated an especially clear 
analytic test for evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp. The court has, 
however, articulated several points that can be assembled into 
such a test. 
The first point is that the BiOp’s evaluation of the effects of 
the proposed action must include a consideration of the action on 
the species recovery.113 The court in Cables articulated a rationale 
similar to that of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in NWF, although 
phrased differently.114 In Cables, environmental groups challenged 
the U.S. Forest Service and the USFWS related to grazing in areas 
designated as critical habitat for the Preble’s meadow jumping 
mouse, specifically including the BiOp for the action.115 The court 
interpreted the definitions within the ESA to establish that the 
purpose of critical habitat is to identify habitat with characteristics 
essential to the conservation of the species.116 Conservation was 
then identified by the court, again based on the statutory text, as 
encompassing recovery.117 The court then concluded that critical 
habitat is adversely modified when the federal action adversely 
affects a species recovery.118 Accordingly, a valid BiOp will consider 
the effects of the proposed federal action on the recovery of the 
species. 
 
113. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1322 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1312-13. 
116. Id. at 1321-22 (“Thus, critical habitat is impaired when features 
essential to the species’ conservation are impaired.”); see also N.M. Cattle 
Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(“Our primary task in construing statutes is to ‘determine congressional intent, 
using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.’ ‘As in all cases requiring 
statutory construction, we begin with the plain language of the law.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
117. Cables, 509 F.3d at 1321. 
118. Id. 
 
19
 150 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
 The Tenth Circuit has also identified the information relied on 
in the BiOp to be of importance. As noted above, the ESA requires 
a BiOp to use the “best scientific and commercial information 
available.”119 The court has not interpreted this requirement as a 
mandate that the action agency or the regulatory agency collect 
new data.120 Instead, the agencies must determine what existing 
data are the “most accurate, reliable, and relevant,” and are good 
science.121 The court noted that reliable, peer-reviewed, and 
scientifically valid methods are the standard against which this 
element should be measured.122 
Finally, courts within the Tenth Circuit have identified a 
requirement for a clear and definite commitment to implementing 
actions intended to benefit listed species, essentially mitigating the 
effects of the proposed action.123 This requirement parallels the 
Ninth Circuit’s similar element, and in fact the courts cited the 
Ninth Circuit in identifying and relying on it.124 
Accordingly, courts within the Tenth Circuit will likely rely on 
these three elements in evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp: 
1) an evaluation of the effects of the proposed action on the 
species recovery; 
2) the use of valid, peer-reviewed scientific data; and 
3) a definite commitment to implementing each piece of the 
proposed action before evaluating it. 
C. The D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit has also not articulated any specific test for 
evaluating a BiOp, other than the standards of the APA. 
 
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
120. Ecology Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1195 n.4 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See Town of Superior v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 
1140 (D. Col. 2012). 
124. Id. (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 
917, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious standard125 is the only 
universal test within the Circuit.126 
 
IV.  THE HYPOTHETICAL OPERATING DECISION 
A. Introduction 
Like the section 7 process generally, as noted above, the tests 
by which the courts evaluate BiOps are simple and 
straightforward . . . on paper. The reality is, again, rather more 
complex. Federal agencies, which each have their own missions, 
their own statutorily driven requirements for action, and which are 
faced with increasing demands for more action in an era of 
shrinking resources, continually struggle with the question of what 
needs to be in a BA and a BiOp versus what should be there versus 
what can be there. Nowhere is this struggle more widespread, 
complex, and fraught with litigation and litigation risk than in 
consultations on complex actions on large river systems in the 
American West. The reader is invited to peruse the countless law 
review articles discussing lawsuits, and their underlying causes, 
related to the ESA and major river systems such as the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin, Columbia, Rio Grande, and 
Colorado, to name a mere few. 
This paper describes a hypothetical operational decision, 
including the hypothetical (and very superficial) environmental 
baseline, and then applies the tests identified by the three Circuit 
Courts of Appeal described above.127 The section 7 consultation is 
 
125. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) 
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (in which the agency “relied on factors which Congress had not 
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference 
in view or the product of agency expertise”). 
126. It is, however, worth noting that in at least one case, the court has 
bserved with approval the detailed and specific nature of an RPA within a BiOp. 
See Oceana v. Gutierrez, 488 F.3d 1020, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
127. The operational decision described here is entirely hypothetical, and 
has been created in this paper for the sole purpose of providing a basis to apply 
the tests. It is not intended to represent what actually happens on the ground, it 
is simply an aid to demonstrate how the tests might be applied. 
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also entirely hypothetical. Although it appears complex, the 
decision described here is extremely simplistic in comparison to a 
real decision on a system like this. Some elements of the decision 
have been inspired by federal actions, but the decision described 
here is not based on any single decision by any federal agency. In 
addition, none of the details of the decision described here are 
guaranteed to be exactly what a federal agency might actually 
decide to do. Operational decisions are based on a vast array of 
factors that are well beyond the scope of this paper to describe 
precisely and comprehensively. Finally, this paper assumes that 
any appeal to the Endangered Species Committee128 is not a viable 
option. 
B. The Hypothetical Operations Decision 
1. The Operations 
The Audubon River (the River) is a major river system that 
flows for nearly 600 miles, from its headwaters in the ruggedly 
iconic Sans Pitié Mountains, across and through three states, to its 
confluence with the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) 
both operate multiple dams on the River and its tributaries, for 
water storage and delivery, flood control, and hydropower 
generation purposes. Each dam is a complete barrier to fish 
passage up or down the stream, barring some sort of additional 
passage facility, which some but not all dams have. Each dam has 
a specific Congressional authorization describing the facility’s 
purposes and function, but which leaves operational decisions to 
the discretion of the managing agency. There are a total of 29 
federal dams on the system. Of those, 14 are primarily hydropower 
generating, 10 are water storage and delivery based, and 5 are for 
 
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)-(h) (2012). The Endangered Species Committee, 
sometimes popularly referred to as the “God Squad,” is a Cabinet level committee 
comprised of seven specific individual members, plus one member from each 
affected state, appointed by the President. Id. A federal agency, the governor of 
the state in which the action may occur, or a permit or license applicant, may 
request the Secretary of the Interior to convene the Committee if a jeopardy BiOp 
has been issued for the action. Id. The Secretary is not required to grant that 
request. Id. The Committee may (but, again, is not required to), after following 
specific procedures, grant an exemption from the section 7 requirement. Id. 
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flood control. Each dam, regardless of purpose, has some ability to 
provide for flood control in emergencies. There are no state or 
privately owned dams on the system. 
The federal agencies operating the facilities on the system 
coordinate their operations with each other, pursuant to a 
Coordinated Operating Agreement (COA). The current COA is 25 
years old, and the agencies are proposing to issue a new COA that 
accounts for the new and projected future conditions in the system. 
The new COA’s terms are outlined in detail in the agreement itself, 
and are summarized in relevant part here: 
• Term: the COA is proposed to extend for a 25 year period; 
• Hydropower dams will pass specific flows through their 
facilities, depending on the time of year, precipitation 
conditions in the system, and customers’ power needs; 
• Water storage/delivery dams will capture and store 
rainfall and snow melt runoff, then either pump the 
stored water out of the system to the agency’s contracted 
customers, or release it through the facilities back into the 
system. The amounts diverted and released are 
dependent on contractual obligations and the amount of 
water available for delivery (the timing of each is 
dependent on the time of year), and water rights 
obligations pursuant to state water law. The COA 
acknowledges that the timing may change, depending on 
the ongoing effects of climate change on precipitation 
patterns; 
• Flood control dams will operate on a ‘pass through’ 
schedule for most of the year, in which the amount of 
water released through the facilities will be the same as 
the amount of water flowing into the reservoir created by 
the dam. When heavy rain or snow fall or runoff is 
anticipated, however, the dams will release enough water 
to safely store the projected incoming water, based on 
predicted recession curves which are revised annually; 
• The Corps retains the authority to declare a flood 
emergency in all or part of the system, and to direct 
specific flow rates and storage in any facility when 
necessary to protect life or property. The COA 
acknowledges this authority, but cannot predict the 
precise conditions under which it will be exercised; 
23
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• Five mainstem dams, pending Congressional 
appropriation and authorization, will design and 
implement fish passage structures which will allow 
unimpeded volitional passage for up and down stream 
movement of fish. Flow through these passage structures 
will be provided at the appropriate times of year, subject 
to an upper limit of total amount of water released 
through each; 
• An array of ‘mitigation measures’ will be implemented 
throughout the system. Some measures are specifically 
identified with descriptions and timing, others are left 
indeterminate over the life of the COA; 
• The COA has predicted how much water will likely be 
available in the system as a whole and in each facility on 
an annual basis, depending on the type of water year for 
the current and three prior years. The calculations 
involved are extraordinarily complex and require 
considerable scientific and engineering expertise to 
understand and implement; and 
• In addition to the other uses in the system, based on those 
same calculations, the COA has identified a specific 
amount of water across the system which will be used to 
provide ‘benefits’ to the listed species on an adaptive 
management basis. Each agency has named three people 
(one senior management, one operations specialist (an 
engineer), and one biologist) to a Benefits Team (BT), 
which can use the water to enhance migration flows, 
provide additional spawning flow, buffer higher summer 
temperatures, or any other use the BT determines will 
benefit one or more species. The COA leaves to the BT the 
decisions on how to identify those benefits. The COA has 
roughly allocated about one third of the amount of water 
to each of three management areas (upper, middle, and 
lower) within the system. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/3
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2. The Species and Habitat 
The system is home to multiple species listed as threatened or 
endangered under the ESA. Four listed anadromous129 fish species 
use the system for spawning, rearing, and migration; critical 
habitat in the system has been designated for three of those 
species. Three listed non-anadromous fish species use the River for 
their entire life cycle; critical habitat in the system has been 
designated for each. Five listed species of birds use the River for 
hunting and feeding, two of which typically nest within 300 yards 
of the water’s edge; critical habitat has been designated for only 
one bird species. One listed mollusk species lives in a single area 
within one tributary, a short distance downstream of a water 
storage/delivery dam, and is found nowhere else in the world. All 
of these species are listed under the ESA, and other than the 
mollusk all use the entire system to varying degrees. There is a 
vast diversity of other fish, wildlife, and plants that use the system 
for one or more portions of their life cycle, in addition to the listed 
species. Two of the anadromous fish species and one of the bird 
species have final recovery plans in place. 
C. The Section 7 Consultation 
Reclamation and the Army Corps determined that the 
proposed COA would adversely affect all of the listed species except 
for the non-anadromous fish species, which would be unaffected by 
the COA. The agencies then jointly prepared and submitted a BA 
to USFWS (for the birds and the mollusk) and NOAA Fisheries (for 
the anadromous fish). USFWS did not agree with the 
determination on the non-anadromous fish and strongly urged the 
action agencies to include the species in the consultation. 
Reclamation and the Army Corps declined to revise their 
determination, and on the advice of counsel USFWS did not 
address those species in the final BiOp. 
 
129. Anadromous fish are born in fresh water, rear in fresh water for some 
period of time, out-migrate to the ocean to continue growing, and then return to 
fresh water to spawn. Marine and Anadromous Fish, NOAA FISHERIES (June 29, 
2016), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/fish [https://perma.cc/42CR-LL8M].  
Some species die after spawning (Semelparity, CAMPBELL BIOLOGY (J. B. Reece et 
al. eds., 10th ed. 2011), others return to the ocean to continue their life cycle 
(Iteroparity, Id.). 
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Being cognizant of the risk of issuing mutually incompatible 
BiOps, USFWS and NOAA Fisheries jointly prepared and issued a 
BiOp. In the BiOp, USFWS determined that the COA would 
jeopardize the existence of the mollusk, but would not jeopardize 
the existence of the birds. The COA would also not destroy or 
adversely modify the designated critical habitat for the bird. NOAA 
Fisheries determined that the proposed COA would jeopardize the 
existence of all four anadromous fish, and would adversely modify 
the designated critical habitats. 
In reaching these determinations, the regulatory agencies 
relied on a considerable body of peer-reviewed scientific literature 
on the status of the species within the River system, as well as 
historic operating patterns of all the dams. They relied in addition 
on information from monitoring reports compiled by Reclamation 
and the Army Corps, on projected changes to hydrologic patterns 
related to climate change, and on casual observations made by 
observers along the River. The agencies specifically incorporated 
discussion of the recovery plans (for those species that had them) 
into the BiOp, and used those plans as a significant part of their 
analysis for the effects on species recovery. The agencies assumed 
that all of the mitigation measures would be implemented in full 
over the course of 25 years, and that the five dams would all have 
full Congressional appropriation and authorization for passage 
structures within the next five years. The agencies assessed the 
effects of the COA on the listed species, on the designated critical 
habitat, and on the ability of the listed species in the River system 
to recover over the 25 year COA lifetime. Finally, the agencies 
assumed that the actions of the BT would provide unquantified 
benefits to listed species over the lifetime of the COA. 
The agencies also developed a draft RPA to address the 
jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, which they 
provided to the action agencies for review. The elements of the 
draft included two representatives on the BT (one from each 
agency), design and implementation of unimpeded volitional 
passage for anadromous fish through three additional dams within 
5 years, minor changes in flow releases from the dam above the 
mollusk population, and operational changes for the hydropower 
and storage/delivery dams that increase flows during times of year 
that would benefit the anadromous fish.  
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/3
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After reviewing the draft RPA, Reclamation and the Army 
Corps vigorously objected to all of the elements of the RPA except 
for the changes to the dam above the mollusk population and the 
inclusion of additional members of the BT. Reclamation and the 
Army Corps primarily cited a lack of authority to implement the 
passage structures, as well as the feasibility of designing and 
implementing them within the required time frame as the basis of 
their objections. Both agencies also objected to the scope and extent 
of the operational changes related to the anadromous fish. 
USFWS and NOAA Fisheries issued a final BiOp, including an 
RPA. The final RPA retained the changes to the BT and the 
mollusk dam, retained the passage structure requirements on the 
three dams, but over ten years instead of five, and reduced the 
extent of the other operational changes. The BiOp also included an 
ITS that precisely quantified the take for all species except the 
mollusk. USFWS determined that the mollusk population was too 
unstable to allow any take, even of the habitat. The ITS included 
specific and general RPMs, with implementing Terms and 
Conditions. Reclamation and the Army Corps accepted the revised 
RPA, signed the new COA, and began implementing its terms.  
Almost immediately, environmental groups challenged the 
BiOp in court, alleging that the document was too lenient and 
provided insufficient protection to listed species. They also 
challenged the BiOp on the grounds that it did not address the non-
anadromous fish species. Simultaneously, hydropower and water 
user groups challenged the BiOp in court, alleging that it was too 
restrictive and constituted an unacceptable reduction in the 
amounts of water and power available to them. 
As described previously, this paper has identified the tests of 
the three Circuits in which a western water decision is likely to be 
challenged. The paper will next work through each court’s test, as 
applied to the hypothetical operating decision and BiOp, and 
predict based on those tests whether the BiOp would be found valid 
by the courts. 
D. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit would likely strike down the BiOp, finding 
parts of it to be legally unacceptable. Recall that the five elements 
likely to be of most importance to the court are: 1) an evaluation of 
the value of the habitat for survival or recovery; 2) identifying what 
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is properly in the environmental baseline; 3) both the long term 
and the short term effects; 4) the project description must be 
accurate, complete, and within the power of the action agency to 
implement; and 5) the regulatory agency must have some idea of 
at what point the existence of the listed species will actually be in 
jeopardy. A panel of the Ninth Circuit would likely take issue with 
the BiOp on elements 3 and 4. 
As described in the hypothetical example, the regulatory 
agencies did consider the effects of the proposed action on the 
species’ recovery. So long as the BiOp contained a reasonably 
discernable path through which a court can follow the agencies’ 
reasoning, that consideration will likely be upheld by the court. 
Likewise, the agencies went to some lengths to evaluate what 
was properly in the environmental baseline. The description does 
not discuss to what extent the BiOp identified the pieces of the 
action as discretionary or non-discretionary, and so a Ninth Circuit 
panel might strike the BiOp down on that point. A BiOp that more 
precisely identifies the discretionary actions while analyzing all 
the actions would likely be more palatable to the court. The 
document relied on extensive information about the species and 
their habitats generally, as well as specific to the River system, and 
included both peer reviewed science and in situ monitoring data. 
Depending on the extent of the discussion of discretionary and non-
discretionary (and how well the ITS matched the discretionary 
pieces) the BiOp would likely survive judicial review in the Ninth 
Circuit on this element. 
A Ninth Circuit panel would, however, likely not be so 
generous on the third element, evaluation of short and long term 
effects. As described, the BiOp analyzed the effects over the long 
term, the 25 year life of the COA. It also analyzed certain actions 
within the next five to ten years. It did not, however, establish any 
link to the effects to the species over a generation of the species 
lifetime. As the Pacific Coast Federation court put it, “[I]t is not 
enough to provide water for the [fish] to survive in five years, if in 
the meantime, the population has been weakened or destroyed by 
inadequate water flows.”130 The BiOp here has no analysis of that 
aspect, and so would likely fall before the court. 
 
130. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
426 F.3d 1082, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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The panel would likely be equally unimpressed by the BiOp’s 
consideration of the fourth element, a complete, accurate, and 
implementable project description. As described, the BiOp is 
relying for its determination on not only uncertain actions by 
Congress, over which no agency has control, but on uncertain 
actions in general. The fish passage funding is entirely out of the 
action agency’s ability to direct – Congress will do what Congress 
will do, and for its own reasons and in its own time. While 
Reclamation and/or the Army Corps could certainly request 
funding for the passage structures within the normal budget cycle, 
the agencies have absolutely no ability to ensure that Congress will 
appropriate those dollars. In the absence of Congressional 
appropriations for them, the agencies would have little to no ability 
to modify the existing dams with the fish passage structures.131 In 
addition, the BiOp relied on mitigation measures in the project 
description that were unclear and uncertain, and which would 
provide uncertain benefits. A Ninth Circuit panel would be very 
likely to strike down the BiOp on that point alone. 
The final element, some idea of at what point the species 
actually is in jeopardy, is similar to the second, in that a panel 
could find either way based on the description given. If the BiOp 
has a reasonable analysis of how the agencies determined jeopardy 
or no, adverse modification or no, such that the court can 
reasonably discern its path, then a panel would likely uphold the 
BiOp. If not, then it would get struck down. As in any case 
involving review under the APA’s standard, an agency articulating 
its rationale is the crucial standard, so that the agency’s path (of 
reasoning) “may reasonably be discerned.”132 
The panel, based on Lockyer and Flowers,133 would likely rule 
in favor of the agencies on the claim that the non-anadromous fish 
 
131. One might argue that the agencies could accomplish the structures out 
of other discretionary funding. This is unlikely at best. Retrofitting a dam for 
unimpeded volitional passage, or even seasonally impeded passage, is an exercise 
generally costing in the tens of millions of dollars range. These are not amounts 
that federal agencies just have lying around ready to hand, especially in the 
current fiscal climate. 
132. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 
Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974)). 
133. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Defs. of Wildlife v. Flowers, 414 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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should have been included in the BiOp. So long as the action 
agencies are able to articulate a rationale for why they made the 
determination that the action would have no effect on the species, 
the court will grant deference to the agency uphold the decision, 
even if as an original matter the court might find differently. 
In summary, were this hypothetical BiOp in front of a Ninth 
Circuit panel, it would likely be held to be invalid, and remanded 
back to the regulatory agencies. The panel would likely find that 
elements 3 and 4 of the test are not met, and could find that 
elements 2 and 5 are not met as well. A BiOp that did, however, 
establish the link between the effects to the species over a 
generation of each species lifetime, that identified what those 
effects are likely to be, and whether those effects will push the 
species over the brink into jeopardy would likely find more favor 
with the court. Similarly, the BiOp as it stands in this hypothetical 
includes actions that are not only uncertain, but are completely 
outside the control of the federal agencies to implement. The BiOp 
could certainly identify those uncertain actions and establish that 
they are uncertain but may in fact occur, but cannot include them 
as part of the action the agencies are evaluating. An analytic 
method that might pass Ninth Circuit muster would be to assume 
the uncertain actions will not occur, and then analyze those actions 
that have specific commitments and make a determination of 
jeopardy or not based on that framework. The agencies could then 
include an analysis of what the effects of the other, uncertain, 
actions would be, so that if one or more does occur the effects are 
included in the consultation and reinitiation134 is not necessary. 
Strategically, the agencies, by knowing what challenges they 
will face before a Ninth Circuit panel, could more carefully craft 
the BiOp to match the test. Alternatively, challengers of the BiOp 
could use that same knowledge to craft arguments around the 
weaknesses of the BiOp in relation to the test. The strategy varies 
 
134. Reinitiation of consultation under section 7 is required when a) the 
amount or extent of incidental take has been exceeded; b) new information reveals 
effects of the action on listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent 
not previously considered; c) the federal action is modified in a manner that 
causes an effect to a listed species or critical habitat that was not previously 
considered; or d) a new species is listed or critical habitat is designated that may 
be affected by the federal action. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2016). A more in-depth 
discussion of reinitiation triggers is not within the scope of this article. 
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(preserve the BiOp versus strike it down), but the tactics of identify 
the test and apply the elements remain the same. Identifying the 
elements (the difficulties, dangers, and distances) and applying 
them on the formation of the country (the court) most skillfully will 
be what carries the day on the battlefield. 
E. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit would also likely strike down the BiOp, 
finding parts of it to be legally unacceptable. Recall that the three 
elements likely to be of most importance to the court are: 1) an 
evaluation of the effects of the proposed action on the species 
recovery; 2) the use of valid, peer-reviewed scientific data; and 3) a 
definite commitment to implementing each piece of the proposed 
action before evaluating it. 
The first element is nearly identical to the Ninth Circuit’s 
element, and would likely be upheld in the Tenth Circuit for the 
same reasons it would in the Ninth. 
The second element is also likely to be upheld. The agencies 
relied on a great deal of scientific peer-reviewed information in 
developing the BiOp, in addition to monitoring data provided by 
the agencies from within the River system. While challengers to 
the BiOp may (and likely will) have their own experts, with the 
administrative record here, the court is unlikely to take sides in a 
“duel of experts.” The court is more likely to allow the regulatory 
agency to “rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified 
experts” than to insert itself into the duel, even if the court might 
find another view more persuasive.135 
The third element of the Tenth Circuit’s test is nearly identical 
to the Ninth Circuit’s fourth element, and would likely be found 
invalid for the same reasons as described above. 
The panel would likely uphold the determination on the non-
anadromous fish, on the same basis the Ninth Circuit would. 
Accordingly, a panel of the Tenth Circuit would likely rule 
against the regulatory agencies, and remand the BiOp back to 
them for revision. 
The strategies and tactics in the Tenth Circuit will be similar 
in form to those in the Ninth. Identification of the tests, and then 
 
135. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). 
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either construction of the BiOp around the elements, or 
construction of the arguments against the BiOp on the same 
elements, will improve the odds of carrying the day. 
F. The D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit is, depending on one’s view, either the easiest 
or the hardest in which to have a BiOp survive review. Recall that 
this Circuit does not have an explicit test, relying instead solely on 
the arbitrary and capricious review of the APA. Under such review, 
the BiOp as described here would likely fail. The uncertainty of 
relying on Congressional action, the uncertainty of the future 
federal agency actions, the unquantifiable benefits offered by the 
action agencies, and the general RPMs are all likely to be found 
arbitrary and capricious, as they have no rational basis on which 
the agencies can articulate any reliance. The federal agency would 
have to hope to convince the reviewing panel that the benefits of 
the uncertainties are sufficiently certain to allow a reasoned basis 
for relying on them. This is not a position any court is likely to find 
convincing. The BiOp would thus likely be remanded by a panel 
back to the regulatory agencies for revision. 
Like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the panel would likely 
uphold the agencies’ determination for the non-anadromous fish, 
and on the same basis as the other courts. The strategies and 
tactics for dealing with the D.C. Circuit are similar in form to those 
of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and with similar improvement in 
the chances of victory. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Each Circuit has a different test, whether express or not, for 
deciding if a BiOp may survive judicial review. No document, 
under any test, can be “bullet proof” and guaranteed to survive 
judicial review. Conversely, there is no “silver bullet” under any 
test that will guarantee remand of a challenged BiOp. Skilled 
lawyering will still have a place, no matter what the agencies do in 
their documents. 
That said, the Ninth Circuit has the most explicit test, while 
the D.C. Circuit appears to rely solely on the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of the APA. In the author’s opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit is likely to be the easiest Circuit in which to successfully 
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challenge or defend a BiOp. The court’s specific elements make it 
relatively simple, at least in theory, to craft a BiOp that can 
successfully withstand review. Alternatively, that same list of 
elements would make it equally simple for a challenger to find a 
fatal weakness in the BiOp, one which can bring the document 
down and sent back to the agency. 
The D.C. Circuit is likely to be the hardest in which to 
challenge a BiOp, as the court relies on the arbitrary and 
capricious standard as its guide. Such a standard allows for 
deference to the agencies, but requires them to articulate a 
rationale for the decisions involved. Without that rationale, the 
decision falls. With that rationale, the decision stands even if the 
court would prefer a different result as an original matter. 
It is tempting to close this paper with airy pronouncements of 
ways to “fix” the complications of the section 7 process as it relates 
to complex water management decisions. There are no such simple 
fixes. The current Congress is extremely unlikely to take any 
action that will untangle the skein of conflicting and confusing 
requirements in a way that continues the successes of the ESA, 
and the author is pessimistic about any Congressional changes 
that will do better that are reasonably certain to occur. The 
prospects in the courts are better, though the varying 
interpretations of statute, regulation, and precedent that range 
across the Circuits will continue to confuse and confound 
practitioners, and provide job security for lawyers, for quite some 
time to come. 
The best hope lies, I think, with the agencies themselves. 
While the conflicts over the use of water that drive the vast 
majority of water/ESA litigation will also not be going away any 
time soon, the agencies that take the lessons of the courts to heart, 
and use them to build better documents, will bring some 
consistency and certainty to the process. The answer is not in 
clamping down and instituting more regional or Washington office 
review – that way lies madness and delay.136 Instead, the agencies 
that develop more training and experience on the ground and in 
the field, that understand what the courts look for, that 
 
136. The sardonic truth of the ancient statement, “I’m from the D.C. office 
and I’m here to help,” remains darkly humorous to this day. To everyone not from 
the D.C. office, at least. 
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understand what the other agencies can and cannot do, and that 
incorporate the real lessons from the courts, those agencies will be 
more often upheld when the courts’ attention is brought to bear. 
The stakeholder groups who so often litigate have lessons to 
learn as well, but once those lessons are learned, may bear 
additional benefits. Stakeholder interests are many and varied, as 
many interests as there are groups, if not more. The central claim 
of them all, however, is that misapplication of the ESA in the 
context of water (among other environmental resource issues, of 
course) has fundamentally damaged their interests. Taking them 
at their word, then, groups that can help the agencies learn how to 
build better documents can add their weight to making the 
documents, and the decisions that underlie them, better, more 
defensible, and more certain. 
No one claims that the Endangered Species Act is perfect. No 
one claims that it can be perfect. It can, however, be made better 
in practice, and learning to calculate the difficulties, dangers, and 
distances involved, and mastering the natural formation of the 
country, are the necessary first steps. 
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